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ABSTRACT
The politicization of religion in the last few decades has created a climate ripe for religious resurgence
in all areas of the world. The decreased role of religion among societies and effective secularization
and modernization of the West have directly influence opposing factors of “religious resurgence”,
“religious fundamentalism”, and “religious revivalism” as a sense of cultural preservation and
balancing new social, economic, emotional and interllectural side effects of modernization growth
(Sahliyeh, 1990). The effects of religious resurgence on Muslim Lebanese women’s efforts to enhance
their freedom, equity, and civil rights need to be explored thoroughly to provide an adequate analysis
of the current needs of women living under religious verdicts. A survey of 284 Lebanese university
student subjects, between the ages of 18-35, regarding attitudes toward women during religious
resurgence was conducted over a period of five years. From the 284 subjects in this study, 124 women
also reported self-assessment levels of self-esteem and life satisfaction. The authors delineate the
interconnectedness among Lebanese women’s religiosity, self-esteem, and life satisfaction levels.
Relationships among attitudes toward women, the number of laws enacted to support women’s rights
and equality, and religious resurgence are also assessed. The results of this study suggest that religious
resurgence tends to reinforce a bias against women from both secular and religious authorities. Thus,
Muslim Lebanese women are vulnerable from within this framework and likely to continue to face
major challenges in efforts to enhance their freedom, equity, and civil rights.

INTRODUCTION
Religious resurgence is one of theocracy’s developmental
stages. According to, (Kaplan et al., 1996). “Religious
resurgence” is a form of religious zealotry by which self-styled
“true-believers” endeavor to establish religious identity, revive
the religious community, and institute alternatives to secular
society. Such a religious resurgence occurred in Lebanon
during the long civil war from 1975 to 1991. As an indicator of
an emerging theocracy, religious resurgence is also an indicator
of the demise of women’s freedom, liberty, and equitable job
opportunities, and the demise of democracy as well. This is
possible because negative legislation enacted during such
resurgence, as well as the attitudes, myths, misperceptions, and
stereotypes held about women, even by women, have led to the
formulation and implementation of public policies designed to
hinder women’s human and civil rights, and eventually a
nation’s democracy (e.g., Afghanistan, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, Sudan, and Yemen). There are forty anti-government,
*Corresponding author:BassimaSchbley1700 SW College Ave. Washburn
University, Topeka, Kansas 66604

low-intensity conflicts documented and afflicting contemporary
international quasi-democracies. Thirty four of these entities
were founded because of Islamic religious resurgence,
(Appleby et al., 2000).This study focused on the effects of
religion on the perception of women’s freedom and human
rights in Lebanon. This research is urgently needed to elucidate
the rights of women in Lebanon in the current political climate,
their adjustment to this religious resurgence and progress
within the current societal , not only in Lebanon but also in all
developing societies. Muslim Lebanese women were selected
to be recruited for participation in this research study for
several reasons. Lebanon provides a unique political
environment that permits the isolation of the effects of Islamic
religious oppression on women.
Muslim Lebanese women’s personal freedom and civil rights
are not governed by national or local laws but by religious
mandates as interpreted by individual sectarian rule, which
involves “personal status codes” derived from Islamic law.
Each of Lebanon’s 18 official sects (Salamay et al., 2009),
possess a distinct personal status code that governs the
domestic and personal affairs of women. “Status Codes” are
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derived from ijtihad, religious interpretation of the Quran and
Sunnah, by male scholars and constitute aposteriori knowledge
through patriarchal interpretations of religious text, (Tabet et
al., 2005). Although some Islamic groups resist Western
influences and rely on pure Sharia interpretation of women’s
rights, the sects continue to be immersed in the Western
subculture and thus share many universal attributes amenable to
cross-cultural comparative analysis.
Religious resurgence within the Middle and Near East has
converged democracies and constitutional monarchies with
religious identities. This resurgence has several common and
unifying goals across countries, primarily to expel the “sweet
lethal poison” of “Westoxification”, (Kramer Kramer et al.,
1991). Politically, the Middle and Near Eastern states range
from “theocratic monarchism” (e.g., Saudi Arabia) to “radical
Islamist governments” (Iran and Libya), and “authoritarian
privatizing states” (Turkey, Tunisia, and Egypt). However,
because of the religious nature of this resurgence and
interconnectedness of the “Umma”, all can be labeled as
“theocracies”, (Hirschl, 2009). Theocracy is a form of civil
government in which “God” (Allah) is recognized as the sole
authority over state affairs.Theocracy is the sole concept of
“state” and the only recognized authority in Islamic Sharia,
which derives laws solely from the Quran and Hadith,
(Lombardi, 2013). However, ijtihad is also an Islamic concept
derived from the Quran, which involves reinterpretation of
Islamic laws by Muslim scholars and jurists through personal
thought and reflection, and may lead the way to providing a
way forward in changing the “Status Codes” for women in
territories that are primarily Muslim. (Harasani et al., 2013),
In addition to theocracy, Lebanese women have to overcome
the nation’s official “confessional” political system, (Dedeyan,
2005). In this system, public offices are assigned according to
religious group. For example, according to Makdisi (2005), the
nation’s president must be a Maronite Christian, the prime
minister must be a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of the house
must be a Shi’a Muslim. Parliament must be divided equally
between Christians and Muslims. However, because of
stipulations from Sharia Law, the overwhelming majority of
government officials are men. Therefore, we postulate that the
synergistic effects of religious resurgence and theocracy restrict
women’s movements for freedom and equality and are
obstacles to their development (Backer et al., 2008).
“Segregation” and “separation” provide a central theme
underlying the oppression of Lebanese women. According to
the ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court on May 17, 1954, in
Brown v. Board of Education, the separate but equal doctrine
that governed U.S. social policies from 1896 to 1954 was
inherently oppressive. Separate was by definition “unequaland
was inconsistent with the concept of equality before the law
established by the American Constitution. (Price, 2001),
Similar theocratic rules currently segregate women from men in
a Muslim society that adheres to strict Shari’a Law
interpretation for social, political, and personal realms of life.
Thistype of religious interpretation of gender segregation
provides fertile ground for “separation” leading to
“oppression”, when the separation implies that one party is
unable to participate in law making, judicial decisions, and
implementation of the laws that are enforced.One of the
physical methods of “segregation” leading to “oppression” as
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interpreted by Western philosophy is the idea of women and the
“head covering” (“hijab”) and “face covering” (“veil” or
“niqab”). For women living in Islamic society, hijab is a
mandatory requirement for female believers according to
Quran and niqabis recommended by the Sunnah(Prophet
Muhammed’s teachings). The question remains, “Is a woman
who wears hijab or niqab because of religious requirement,
“oppressed” or “subjugated” by Sharia Laws or is hijab a
personal right and freedom that should be left unmanaged by
unattached Western feminists who pose as “saviors of the
oppressed? (Danchin et al., 2012). ”Perhaps the answer to that
question lies in pluralisms that may not simplify the legalities
based upon the cloth itself, but in the intention of the woman
behind the hijab or niqab. Was the hijab or niqaba choice
given to women as part of their unique personal belief system?
Are women free to choose to wear or not wear the hijab or
niqab? Or is the decision of a woman left to male elites, created
as a legal requirement (legal requirement to veil or to unveil in
order to participate in society) aimed at discrediting her choice
of clothing? Research suggests many Muslim women choose to
veil to preserve their gender difference and identification,
others utilize it as a religious or cultural statement. (Greene,
2013), Dichotomous oppressions ensue in pluralsocieties, one
that embraces the “veil” as a mandatory religious requirement
that omits women from intellectual contribution and the other
that forbids a woman wear the “veil” as part of an oppressive
punishment for religious belief.
Neither ruleconsiders the individual preferences of the woman
for whom such a law is rendered justice within a particular
culture or society. The answer is not yet clear how a country as
diverse as Lebanon would react to such religious rule.
However, if the primary intent behind legally requiring “veiling
or unveiling” is forced and created for the purpose of
“separation of women from any part of society”, then inequality
is the underlying outcome for women who live under such a
regime. Forced separation based on gender is inherently
oppressive (Allen et al., 2008).However, by not providing a
choice to women, to veil or not to veil, women are subjugated
under parallel rule that sexually objectifies women by
demanding exposure of her body, thus rendering the woman
powerless over her own body (Szymanski, 2011). There is
alack of research addressing Lebanon’s religious resurgence
and its impact on citizens’ movements, which requires a review
of issues relevant to women’s rights and religious resurgence,
including: (1) What is the status of women in Lebanon and the
Middle East? (2) Why is it important to understand the status of
women in Lebanon and the Middle East? (3) What are the
implications of this study for social policy, social work
intervention, social research, and social work education?
What is the status of women in Lebanon and the Middle
East?
Until recently, the status of women, specifically their identity
and life circumstances, has traditionally been defined
worldwide in relation to their families, not to the market or the
community. (Kay, 2000), However, Lebanese women’s
struggle for political independence and socioeconomic equality
has been divorced from family law reforms and from laws
concerning employment discrimination, (Shehadeh, 1998). The
contemporary legal shift in the status of married women in
Lebanon is regressing. Women are being forced back into the
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sole confinement of the private sphere of family lives, away
from the public arena of community, regional, and national
affairs that Lebanon’s pre-religious resurgence had provided,
and where women found a progressive, promising, and
nurturing milieu, (Herzberg, 2013).
The milestones along this momentous path back in time mark
the extent that Lebanese women were able to acquirethe
essential preconditions for social, economic, and political
independence including education, employment, and equity in
the labor market. In 2000, even though 50% of the country’s
population was women, less than 23% of them were employed,
whereas 31% were employed in 1980. In 2000, the average
salary of men was 27% to as much as 85% higher than that of
women, compared to less than 47% higher in 1980. In 2000 the
illiteracy rate among females age 10 and older was reported to
be 16%, compared to 2.7% among males. (Lebanese women
situation in numbers, 2000), A 2003 study reported that in
2000, 20% of women over age 15 were illiterate compared to
8% of men over the same age. (Roudi-Fahimi, 2003), A more
recent report by the United Nations Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW,
2006) notes that in general illiteracy is in decline, but a gap
remains between men (5.6%) and women (10%). However,
about 27% of poor women and 76% of extremely poor women
do not attend school beyond the sixth standard grade and only
14% of all women in Lebanon reach the university level.
(United Nations Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, 2006),
These statistics are affirmed in the UNDP’s 2000 Human
Development Report (HDR), in which Lebanon was ranked 101
out of a total of 175 countries, with a human development
index (HDI) of 0.757. The 2000 HDR report blamed Lebanon’s
low ranking on its ethno-religious civil war, violence, and
instability, (United Nations, 2009). However, if we consider the
religious resurgence period that began in the last several years,
it would be appropriate to further examine religious resurgence
as a possible facilitator of the low HDR ranking. The decrease
in Lebanon’s HDI during its religious resurgence is paralleled
by a decrease in the UNDP standard of living for females, but
not for males.In 2000 Lebanese women’s UNDP standard of
living index was 63 and that of men was 74 compared tothe
UNDP index for 1984, where it was reported at 68 for women
and 71 for men.
In 2012, the female labor force participation was reported at
22.6% for females and 70.8% for males. (UNDP Human
Development Report, 2013), This is a considerable regression
in the standard of living for women and a widening of the gap
between women and men (from 3 index points to 11 index
points) during a time in which both men and women
experienced the same environmental conditions of civil unrest,
violence, and religious resurgence. Of the 38 countries,
including Lebanon, ranked lower in 2000 than in 1984, 35 were
Muslim Middle-Eastern countries undergoing religious
resurgence. (United Nations Development Programme,
2000),According to UNDP annual HDR reports from 1984 to
2000, 88 women out of 100 were receiving health care during
pregnancy in the year 2000, whereas 89 women out of 100
received such health care in 1982. In 2000, 47% of Lebanese
women used modern contraceptive measures, whereas in 1984
more than 52% did. Only two Lebanese women were
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parliamentarians in 2000, whereas three occupied such seats in
1982. Two women were director generals in 1998, whereas five
women held such a position in 1984. Two women were
appointed ambassadors in 1994, while three ascended to this
rank in 1980. To date, no Lebanese women have ever held
ministerial or head of municipality positions. From 2000 to
2012, although HDI improved slightly for the entire population,
women continue to fall behind with respect to maternal health,
empowerment, and economic activity. (UNDP Human
Development Report, 2013), Most demonstrative of the effects
of religious resurgence on women’s education, equity, and
employability in Lebanon are data from the UNDP Statistics
Division. These data show that Lebanese women in
professional associations have had one of the lowest increases
in membership since 1990 (UNDP 1984–2000). (United
Nations, 2009), Most of the nations that have received such
regressive evaluations for the same period are Middle Eastern
Muslim countries undergoing religious resurgence (Syria,
Libya, and Egypt). The cultural and gender privy constraints of
religious resurgence are unavoidably coupled with common,
universal socioeconomic and political impediments that
contemporary women must overcome in order to regain equity,
equality, and freedom.
Equally important, this study found strong statistical
relationships between the number of conservative religious
parliamentarians and the number of laws enacted to support
women’s rights. Before Lebanon’s religious resurgence, no
representative of a religious organization ever held any of
Lebanon’s 128 parliamentary seats. Between 1990 and 2000,
12 parliamentarians representing Amal and Hezbullah were
elected and re-elected in the four Lebanese parliamentary
elections, as well as 19 representatives of conservative
Christian-based coalitions. (Schbley, 2002), Ninety-five percent
of this study’s respondents who indicated an affiliation with a
religious organization and voted compared to an average of
71.3% of eligible voters in the Muslim enclaves of Baalbek,
Bekaa, Hermil, Nabatieh, and South-Lebanon. The total
national voting average is below 41%, (Lebanese women
situation in numbers, 2000). This finding is significant because
it shows the perception of political freedom for voters from a
very conservative religious affiliation and those from a nonreligious sectors.Since the mobilization of the first Lebanese
women’s movement in 1953, until Lebanon’s religious
resurgence in the 1990s, its parliament had enacted seven laws
granting women limited freedom, equality, and equity rights.
During this same period, Egypt, Turkey, Morocco, Algiers,
Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Tunis, and
Libya each passed fewer than sevenlaws designed to empower
women with additional civil rights and freedom (UNDP, 1984–
2000). Therefore, except for reforms in IsraelLebanon’s pre1990 reforms of women’s civil rights were ahead of all other
Middle Eastern nations. However, from 1990 to 1995, only
three laws were passed in Lebanon designed to empower
women with additional civil rights and freedom (Table 1),
whereas, Egypt, Israel, Turkey, Morocco, Algiers, Jordan,
Bahrain, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Tunis, and Libya have
each passed five or more laws designed to empower women
with additional civil rights and freedom (UNDP, 1984–2000).
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Table 1. List of Enacted Laws Addressing Women’s Issues
Before 1990 (Year & Description)
1952 -- Women acquire the right to vote.
1960 -- A Lebanese woman married to a foreigner acquires the right to retain her
Lebanese citizenship if she so chooses.
1974 -- Women no longer require their husbands' written permission to obtain a
Lebanese passport.
1984 -- The use of contraceptives becomes legal through a legislative decree by the
executive branch. Abortion is still illegal under Lebanese law.
1986 -- Lebanon ratifies the Convention on All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW), with reservations pertaining to nationality transfer and family laws.
1987 -- The retirement age (64) becomes equal for both women and men. Before that, it
was 60 for men and 55 for women.
1988-- Lebanon ratifies the Convention on All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, with reservations pertaining to Employment, Civil, and Human Rights.

Importance of understanding the status of women in
Lebanon
Although the social and ethno-religious climates in the United
States are distinguishable from those in Lebanon and the
Middle East, the impact of religiosity levels on women’s civil
rights movements, equity, and freedom may be the same. This
research attempts to contribute to the study of patterns and
processes of societal changes and the impact of religiosity
levels on women’s civil rights movements across cultures and
nations. This study attempted to denote the outcomes of
religious restraints on women’s movement, freedom of speech,
civil and human rights, and equality regardless of boundaries,
cultures, religions, languages, or races. By illustrating the
extent of ethno-religious constraints on women, it provides an
impetus for American, Lebanese, and international feminist
movements to preempt future legislation, political action, or
movements that seek to curtail women’s freedom in the name
of religion.
What are the implications for national and international
social work practice?
Social work research is about delineating the interplay of power
and empowerment not only among races and socioeconomic
classes, but also between genders and among religions and
cultures. This study is an attempt to address the lack of
knowledge regarding the relationship between religious
resurgence and women’s movements. Furthermore, this study
will address basic knowledge for international workers as they
work with Muslim populations in various healthcare, political,
and economical situations. In addition, this study will attempt
to add to the cumulative knowledge about Middle Eastern
cultural exegesis and women’s educational and socioeconomic
situations. Future clinical application of this study should assist
international health and social workers with the design of
treatment plans targeted at clients’ oppression and abuse within
the context of religious insurgence within the Middle East,
particularly Lebanon. Finally, this study aims to assist in
assisting preventive measures for future clients and to empower
social work practitioners to anticipate future impediments to
their clients’ liberty, freedom, and equity. The implications of
this study extend beyond clinical walls into the streets, families,
homes, and businesses of our global village. Illuminating the
effects of religious resurgence on women’s freedom and human
rights is crucial for women’s physical and psychosocial
adjustment, and for progress in developing societies.

After 1990 (Year & Description)
1993 -- A female witness becomes equal to a male witness
in real estate transactions.
1994 -- Women acquire the right to engage in commerce
without their husband's authorization. A woman in the
Lebanese diplomatic corps who marries a foreigner is no
longer required to quit her position or transfer back to
Lebanon.
1995 -- Women acquire the right to take on a life
insurance policy without their husband's authorization.

Furthermore, it is important to understand the Islamic cultural
perspectives of the women in this study to further develop a
culturally sensitive plan for inherent and autonomous change.
STUDY PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW
The overall hypothesis of this study is that religious resurgence
and the level of religious fundamentalism in Lebanon will
indirectly correlate to the strength and the likelihood of
women’s civil rights and equity movements. The attitude of
Lebanese women and their movements for civil rights and
equity will depend directly upon the level of their religiosity,
self-esteem, and life satisfaction. The following research
questions are extensions of the primary hypothesis:
1. Will the difference between the means of women’s
responses/scores on the Attitudes Toward Women Scale.
(Spence, 1997), increase as the number of conservative
religious parliamentarians in Lebanon increases, and will the
number of pubic entities that represent gender equality relative
to regional and international development decrease?
2. Which group of Lebanese women has higher self-esteem
scores? Groups are categorized according to the AWS as (1)
zealots, (2) those with a strong association with religious
resurgence, (3) those with a tempered association with religious
resurgence, and (4) those with a weak association with religious
resurgence.
3. What is the strength of relationship between Lebanese
women’s religiosity levels (Zealot, Strong Association,
Tempered Association, Weak Association) and their current
perception of life satisfaction (very satisfied, satisfied,
dissatisfied, very dissatisfied)?

MATERIALS AND MATHODS
In the effort to delineate some of the effects of religious
resurgence on women's freedom and civil rights, the statistical
significance of the study’s three hypotheses were tested. The
significance level α was set at 0.05. Both parametric and
nonparametric correlations were applied for analyses.
Statistical Analyses, Significance, and Post Hoc Tests
H1o: There is no relationship between the means of genders’
response/scores on the AWS, the number of conservative
religious parliamentarians, the number of public entities that
are forbidden by sharia (dance halls, cabarets) and the number
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of laws enacted to support women’s rights in Lebanon. Oneway analysis of variance (ANOVA), followed by a post-hoc
Bonferroni analysis, allowed this research to analyze mean
differences between gender scores on the AWS, the number of
conservative religious parliamentarians, and the number of
laws enacted to support women’s rights in Lebanon.
H2o: There is no relationship between Lebanese women’s
religiosity levels and their self-esteem scores.The strength and
direction of the relationships of these variables were
determined by a Spearman rho correlation coefficient test.
H3o: There is no relationship between Lebanese women’s
religiosity levels and their perception of life satisfaction. The
strength and direction of the relationships of these variables
were determined by a Spearman rho correlation coefficient.
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satisfaction. Hence, the outcomes of this research effort are a
30-item Religiosity Level Scale (RLS) modeled after O’Neill
and Kenny’s (1998) measure, a 10-item Self-Esteem Scale
(SES) adapted from Rosenberg (1979), and a 10-item Life
Satisfaction Scale in which seven of the items were adapted
from Gilman and Huebner’s (1997) study, (O’Neill, 1998). A
Delphi panel of three women and women’s studies experts
assessed the face and content validity of this study’s AWS and
RLS scales. This panel was also asked to validate each of the
supplemental items on the scales according to proportion,
frequency, and number of criteria. Two of the three judges
validated each question prior to its inclusion in the final
versions of the questionnaires. The content validity of the SES
scale is accepted due to its prior publication and adoption by
the various researchers identified earlier.
Coding of Answers to the Life Satisfaction Scale

Speculative Assumptions
Interpretive analysis of this study’s narrative inquiry and testing
of its three hypotheses is limited by the following five
speculative assumptions:
1. Lebanon’s religious resurgence was not imposed by foreign
forces.
2. Lebanon is an independent and sovereign democracy.
3. Lebanon’s religious resurgence encompassed all of its 18
religious sects.
4. Lebanon’s economy was stable before its religious
resurgence.
5. Solutions to Lebanon’s confessional inequities may be
achieved through its secular/political entities.
Research Instruments
To test this study’s three hypotheses, self-report instruments for
data collection assessing respondents’ attitudes toward women,
religiosity levels, self-esteem, and life satisfaction are needed.
They were designed, formulated, and constructed to be
implemented by this study.
Attitudes Toward
Operationalization

Women

Scale

Selection

The coding system for the outcomes of Sections III and IV of
the Life Satisfaction Scale, which “assumes that although
individuals possess unique self-concept contents, the overall
structure of self-concept may be common across individuals,”
was adopted from Gordan et al. (1968). Analyses of
participants’ comments were thus reduced to simple tabulation
of frequencies of codes or themes. The sum of this tabulation
constituted a composite variable that identified a respondent’s
level of life satisfaction (Chatah et al., 2008)
Tests for Reliability
A computer-based statistical package for social science
research programs (SPSS 19.0) was used to assess the
reliability of this study’s modified instruments. Tests of the
internal consistency of the AWS and RLS scales were
conducted on independent samples soon after their design.
These self-report instruments were presented to 71 students in
research methods classes at Wichita State University, Wichita,
Kansas. The average Cronbach alpha for all the items on both
questionnaires was .76, yielding a strong internal consistency
for all four matrixes.

and

For this research, we adapted Spence and Hahn’s 15-item AWS
scale, supplemented by five additional questions designed and
formulated by the first author to reflect relevant contemporary
equity and equality issues. One open-ended question was added
to permit participants to formulate and express, in their own
words, their thoughts about their own attitudes toward women
and perceptions of changes in those attitudes toward women.
Measures of Religiosity, Self-Esteem, and Life Satisfaction
Levels Questionnaire
The study of religious resurgence in Lebanon must assess the
religiosity levels of Judeo-Christians and Muslims. However, a
cursory review of the literature reveals that although several
researchers have designed and/or implemented a religiosity
scale, all are based on a belief in Judeo-Christian canons (e.g.,
Duke University Religion Index. To our knowledge, no scales
have been developed to measure Muslim levels of religiosity,
self-esteem, and life satisfaction. Thus, the first author
formulated a cross-religion scale for evaluating Lebanese
religiosity levels.In addition to assessing religiosity levels, this
study’s hypotheses called for measures of self-esteem and life

Dissemination of Questionnaires
The AWS and RLS questionnaires were distributed to
prospective subjects in the fall of 1999 and again in the early
spring and summer of 2004 by the PI and co-investigator.
During each time period, 142 participants voluntarily signed
consent forms and returned questionnaires. Thus, a total of 284
individuals participated in the study. The participants were
students at the American University in Beirut and the Lebanese
American University. During each dissemination phase,
questionnaires were given to prospective respondents with
envelopes labeled with on-campus addresses.Hence, the
attitudes of Lebanese university students toward Lebanese
women provided this study with the point of reference for
understanding the role of women in Lebanon before and during
a period of religious insurgence. The two questionnaires were
seeking to identify the relationships between respondents’
levels of religiosity and their levels of self-esteem and life
satisfaction.
Sample and Sampling Limitations
To address this study’s three research questions, a large sample
able to accommodate both statistical and practical (cost and
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feasibility) considerations, as well as fluctuations in
assumptions and lack of knowledge, was mandated. Thus, this
study had to overcome issues of time, security, money, and
other difficulties inherent in attempting to sample a
heterogeneous post–civil-war population. To date, Lebanon
remains divided along invisible militarized, sectarian, cultural,
and socioeconomic boundaries. Most Lebanese homes have yet
to be equipped with operational utilities and telephone lines.
Most Lebanese do not speak English and donot receive mail
service. Lebanon’s 15-year civil war and postwar occupation by
foreign and factional forces, through which most rations and
resources are distributed, have rendered its cognitive citizenry
suspicious of all inquiries and distant from all unfamiliar faces.
Thus, to overcome these significant limitations, this study’s
self-administered, self-report questionnaires were handdelivered to English-speaking students between 18 and 29 years
of age from middle- to upper-middle-class backgrounds who
lived with family members, reported strong religious fellowship
and political membership, and participated in some political
and/or religious organization. Although the questionnaires
were not randomly administered, they yielded vital data that
were necessary and may be sufficient to test the study’s null
hypotheses(Table 2).
Table 2. Sample Composition and Demographics (N = 284)

Total
Lebanese Citizen
Voted Before
Ever Been Employed
Married & Engaged
Household Annual
Income Above $60,000
Sect/Religion

Male (n = 91)
1999
2004
34
57
21
38
25
43
0
0
3
12

Female (n = 193)
1999
2004
108
85
98
52
108
52
5
7
31
38

29

34

98

79

MI = 9
CP = 1
MS = 3
DR = 4
CC = 3
CM = 4
CO = 6
OT = 4

MI = 14
CP = 3
MS = 12
DR = 5
CC = 5
CM = 6
CO = 6
OT = 6

MI = 27
CP = 21
MS = 9
DR = 2
CC = 11
CM = 9
CO = 12
OT = 17

MI = 18
CP = 6
MS = 14
DR = 5
CC = 9
CM = 10
CO = 11
OT = 12

RESULTS
A significant statistical relationship was found between an
increase in the number of mosques and churches and a decrease
in the number of laws for women (p<.01). Furthermore,
decrease in the number of mixed public gathering entities was
also found to be significantly reduced since the beginning of
the period of religious resurgence (p<.01). Since Lebanon’s
religious resurgence in the early 1990s, most of the residential,
commercial, and tourist areas have witnessed an overwhelming
decrease in the number of public entities that provide public
meeting, entertainment, and social mixing. This study also
found strong inverse statistical relationships between the
number of conservative religious parliamentarians and the
number of laws enacted to support women’s rights.Among the
participants in the 1999 survey, the mean difference between
respondents who expressed egalitarian attitudes toward women
and those whoexpressed traditional attitudes toward women
was .2717. The paired t-test yielded a significant difference
between the two groups with p-value of .009 (Table 3).
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Table 3. Paired-Samples t Tests
Paired Differences
Mean
SD

Pair
AWS
Traditional
vs.
Egalitarian 1999 Cohorts
AWS
Traditional
vs.
Egalitarian 2004 Cohorts
Religious Membership vs.
Level of Religiosity
Religious Membership vs.
Level of Self-Esteem
Religious Membership vs.
Level of Life Satisfaction
Levels of Religiosity vs. SelfEsteem
Levels of Religiosity vs. Life
Satisfaction

t

p-value
(2-tailed)

.2717

.92790

2.684

.009

.4823

1.3204

7.1003

.000

.5048

1.73488

2.667

.005

.9643

1.75279

5.042

.000

.9553

1.8969

5.298

.000

−.4595

.44201

−9.528

.000

−.2738

.73366

−3.421

.001

Among the 2004 participants, the mean difference between
respondents who expressed egalitarian attitudes toward women
and those who expressed traditional attitudes toward women
was .4823. When the mean difference among the 2004
participants was compared to that of the 1999 participants, the
outcomes from this comparison permitted us to infer that the
difference in the traditional and egalitarian attitudes toward
women increased significantly from 1999 to 2004. The
independent two-sample t-tests comparing the mean scores
between 1999 and 2004 are both significant at α = .05 in
traditional and egalitarian groups, respectively (Table 4).
Table 4. Independent Samples Tests (1999 versus 2004)

AWS Traditional
AWS Egalitarian

Mean Difference
.105
1.213

t-test
t
3.403
14.180

p-value (2-tailed)
.042
.001

ANOVA and post-hoc Bonferroni analyses confirmed the
significant difference between the means of respondents who
expressed egalitarian attitudes and those who expressed
traditional attitudes toward women regarding the number of
conservative religious parliamentarians, the number of public
entities for gender mixing, and the number of laws enacted to
support women’s rights in Lebanon. These five mean
differences were tightly clustered and highly significant, with
p-values <.01 and test statistics F varying from 12.999 to
26.849 (Table 5).These outcomes suggest that the number of
bars, cabarets, and laws favoring women’s equalityandfreedom
are uniform, homogeneous, and predictive of the number of
conservative religious parliamentarians and differences in
attitudes toward women.
Table 5. Anova
Between-groups Unweighted and
Weighted Scales
Questions Favoring Conservative
Positions
Questions Favoring Egalitarian
Positions
Regression of the number of bars
(Predictors) of the difference in
attitudes.
Regression of the number of
cabarets (Predictors) of the
difference in attitudes.
Regression of the number of laws
(Predictors) of the difference in
attitudes.

Sum of
Squares
.875

Mean
Square
.875

F
12.999

pvalue
.006

1.021

1.021

21.349

.000

11.123

11.123

20.991

.000

12.495

12.495

26.760

.000

12.121

12.122

26.849

.000
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The nonparametric Cochran Odds Ratio test was selected to
determine which group of Lebanese women (the zealot, those
with strong association with religious resurgence, those with
tempered association with religious resurgence, and those with
weak association with religious resurgence) has higher selfesteem and life satisfaction scores. This test is ideal for the
analysis of matched subjects and permits us to infer that
Lebanese women with weak association with religious
resurgence have self-reported the highest self-esteem (4.09)
and life satisfaction (4.59) scores; most of these women were
Protestant Christians. Concomitantly, Lebanese women who
self-reported zealot religiosity levels also self-reported the
lowest levels of self-esteem (1.19). The majority of this group
were from the Muslim Shi’a sect. Concurrent with these two
groups, Lebanese women who self-reported strong association
with religious resurgence also self-reported the lowest levels of
life satisfaction (1.32). The majority of this group were from
the Muslim Sunni sect (Tables 3 and 6).
Table 6: Means of Respondents’ Religiosity, Self-Esteem, and Life
Satisfaction Levels (Homogeneity assessed with Cochran Odds
Ratio Tests)
Respondents who SelfReported Religiosity
Level of:
Zealot
Strong Association
Tempered Association
Weak Association

Self-Reported Levels
of Self-Esteem

Self-Reported Levels
of Life Satisfaction

1.19 (Lowest)
1.98
2.91
4.09

2.78
1.32 (Lowest)
3.56
4.59

Hence, the outcomes of these Cochran post-hoc tests and those
described in Table 3 permit us to reject our second and third
null hypotheses, and conclude that there is a significant
relationship between Lebanese women’s religiosity levels and
their levels of self-esteem and life satisfaction.
Conclusion
Our study found that gender equity improved in some areasfor
Muslim Lebanese women since the beginning of religious
resurgence from 1999 to 2004 and declined in other areas such
as health care, political office holdings, and education. A 2004
Shadow Report published by CEDAW (National Committee
for the Follow-up on Women’s Issues, 2007) recognized some
improvements since 1999 in increased female involvement in
the public sector and in the judiciary. However, only 3 of 128
deputies in the government were women and that number has
not changed into 2012. Women’s participation remained at
2.3%, one of the lowest rates in the world. According to the
2004 report, illiteracy rates continued to drop through 2012,
but the rate among women continued to be higher than the rate
among men and women employed in the workforce continued
to be over 50% lower than their male counterparts. Age and
location continue to be significant factors, with older and rural
women having the highest illiteracy rates and unemployment
outside the home. An encouraging note is that the gap is
narrowing in younger age groups. Nevertheless, overall the
2004 report concluded that gender equity has not become a
reality.CEDAW published another Shadow Report in 2007
(National Committee for the Follow-up on Women’s Issues,
2007). After reviewing the same aspects of gender as they had
in 2004, the authors concluded: “The information we revealed
in this report proves the fragility of the ads and procedures
which the government adopted since 2004 until today. The
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ministerial statement which allocated a paragraph for women is
still ink on aper” (p. 74).Sadly, a recent United Nations report
(2009) reinforces this conclusion. According to this report,
despite some progress, both the HDI and the Gender
Development Index (GDI) demonstrate ongoing inequalities
between men and women. For example, illiteracy levels remain
higher among women than among men.
There is a note of encouragement in this report that female
students outnumber male students at both secondary and
tertiary education levels.More specifically, the Gender
Empowerment Measure (GEM), which evaluates women’s
opportunities rather than their capabilities, suggests that gender
equity is far from being achieved. The GEM measures three
aspects of gender inequality: political participation, economic
participation, and power over economic resources. In 1992 the
GEM for women was 0.212, reflecting a very low level of
achievement in these three areas. According to the UN report
(2009), in 1992 Lebanon ranked 103 out of 116 countries
evaluated. By 2008 the GEM for Lebanese women had risen to
0.350, still not a satisfactory improvement. The UN report
acknowledges some improvements in the judicial area, where
the number of female justices doubled between 1995 and 2004,
from 55 to 107, while the number of male justices remained
about the same (from 291 to 307). Nevertheless, the gap
remains significant.
The UN report notes some increased control of women over
economic resources related to greater participation in the work
force and higher rates of academic enrollment. Nevertheless,
the report states: “there are still possibilities for improvement,
particularly given the levels of female graduates at the tertiary
level, the increasing level of female participation in the labor
force, and the rising number of female entrepreneurs” (p. 55).
Moreover, “despite considerable gains, gender empowerment
at decision-making levels remains pitifully low, particularly
when the comparatively high levels of females enrolled in and
graduating from tertiary level education are considered” (p.
58).More broadly, gender inequity continues to be reflected in
laws related to citizenship rights. For example, a non-Lebanese
woman who marries a Lebanese man is automatically granted
residency and nationality. Children from such a marriage are
also granted nationality automatically. On the other hand, a
non-Lebanese man who marries a Lebanese woman is not
automatically granted residency or nationality. He will be
granted residency “only if he certifies that he will not engage in
remunerated jobs, proves that he has a monthly income of LL5
million from transfers or pension fund and provides a bank
statement proving he has an excess of LL300 million” (p. 59).
If the man cannot gain residency on these terms, he becomes
stateless or an illegal resident, as are any children born to the
marriage.
The study has several limitations. As noted at the beginning,
there is a lack of comparative cross-cultural research. In
addition, the surveys were conducted only with students, so
education and age factors also limit the generalizability of the
findings reported here. Nevertheless,this study suggests that
Muslim religious resurgence is biased against women. The data
reported here permit the inference that women’s movements
during Muslim religious resurgence have experienced and will
continue to experience major challenges to attaining equality
and equity in the labor force, and in maintaining civil rights,
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human rights, freedom of speech, suffrage, and political
representation.
Endnotes
1. Recent dramatic events in the Middle East may require a recategorization of some countries including Syria and Egypt.
2. Defined in the U.S. Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 1983, and
1984, and in the U.S. Voting Rights Act of 1965.
3. Due to Lebanon’s republican form of government, its
presidents and ministers may only be elected from the ranks of
its parliamentarians. Both Amal and Hizbullah are Muslim
Shi’a religious organizations.
4. As reported in a major Lebanese newspaper Al-Nahar, on
September 6, 1992; September 15, 1996; and September 3,
2000, respectively, in the aftermath of three Lebanese national
parliamentary elections.
5. Seven items of Gordon’s (1968) nine-category coding system
were employed to compartmentalize some of the study
participants’ self-reported
assessments: (1) ascribed
characteristics and material-physical self; (2) roles and
memberships; (3) activities and interests; (4) abstract
identification; (5) systemic self-reflection; (6) interpersonal
social self; and (7) reference to the external situation.
6. Churches, mosques, dance halls, and cabarets were selected
because they are readily visible indicators that may be used to
measure religious resurgence. Business listings in phone books
from 1990 and 2004 were used to deduce these numeric
observations.
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